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A cryptarithm is something like
SEND
MORE
MONEY
For the letters, you must substitute distinct digits such that the words
become numbers. In the above example, MONEY must be the sum of SEND
and MORE.
We only consider cryptarithms of the above type, e.g. with two sum-
mands.
D. Eppstein already showed in [1] that Cryptarithms is NP-complete. He
reduced from 3-SAT, but did not show ASP-completeness. Furthermore, his
proof relies on a classical combinatorial result. We reduce from (1 in 3)-SAT
instead. See [2] for the meaning of ASP-completeness.
Let us first assume that the letters do not need to be distinct digits. Then
we have a variant of cryptarithms which is ASP-complete for any base ≥ 2.
The following symbolic digits on the right ensure that ci = i for all given ci,
where b is the base:
· · · c0 c0 c1 c0
· · · c0 c0 cb−1 c0
· · · c0 c1 c0 c0
We write 0, 1, b−1 instead of c0, c1, cb−1 from now. Let a1, a2, . . . , an ∈ {0, 1}
be the variables of our instance of 3-SAT and a′i := 1 − ai the inverse of ai.
The following symbolic digits enforce that ai ∈ {0, 1} and a′i = 1− ai:
· · · 0 ai 0 · · ·
· · · 0 a′i 0 · · ·
· · · 0 1 0 · · ·
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Say that the jth equation denotes a′2 + a4 + a7 = 1 (all others are similar).
This equation can be coded as
· · · 0 tj 0 a′2 0 · · ·
· · · 0 a7 0 a4 0 · · ·
· · · 0 1 0 tj 0 · · ·
So we can reduce (1 in 3)-SAT to cryptarithms without distinct digits for
any base ≥ 2.
Next, we show that Cryptarithms with distinct digits is ASP-complete,
again by reducing from (1 in 3)-SAT. Since there are only b! possibilities to
check, the base b can not be bounded. Again, write a1, a2, . . . , an for the
variables of an arbitrary instance of (1 in 3)-SAT and a′1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
n for their
inverses.
Take the base b at least 8(n2 + 3n + 1) such that 4 | b. We will use the
following symbolic digits:
• c0 = 0, c4 = 4, c8 = 8, . . ., cb−4 = b− 4 and c1 = 1 and c2 = 2,
• a¯i = ai + 4i + 1, a¯′i = a′i + 4i + 1, aˆi = ai + 4(n + 1)i + 1 and aˆ′i =
a′i + 4(n + 1)i + 1, for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• di = 4(n(n+ 2) + i) + 2 + aib/2 and d′i = 4(n(n+ 2) + i) + 2 + a′ib/2 for
all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
• ti,j = min(a¯i + aˆj, a¯′i + aˆ′j) and ti,j = min(a¯i + aˆ′j, a¯′i + aˆj) for some i 6= j
with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
If the rightmost part of the cryptaritm looks like
· · · c0 c0 cb−4 c0 cb−8 c0 · · · c0 c8 c0 c4 c0 c2 c0 c1 c0
· · · c0 c0 c4 c0 c4 c0 · · · c0 c4 c0 c4 c0 c2 c0 c1 c0
· · · c0 c1 c0 c0 cb−4 c0 · · · c0 c12 c0 c8 c0 c4 c0 c2 c0
then the base b and all ci are determined. Again, we write i instead of ci
from now. Since the ai are no digits in our cryptarithm, we may define
ai := a¯
′
i mod 2. The following enforces a¯i, a¯
′
i, aˆi, aˆ
′
i, di and d
′
i to have their
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given values:
· · · 0 a¯′i di 0 di 0 a¯i d′i 0 0 a¯i 0 a¯′i 0 · · ·
· · · 0 2 di 0 d′i 0 2 d′i 0 0 4ni 0 4ni 0 · · ·
· · · 0 4i+
4
8(n
(n
+
2)
+
i)
+
4
0 8(n
(n
+
2)
+
i)
+
4
+
b/2
0 4i+
4
8(n
(n
+
2)
+
i)
+
4
0 0 aˆi 0 aˆ
′
i 0 · · ·
Since a¯′i ≡ ai (mod 2), di + di relieves a carry if and only if ai = 1 and di
has the desired value. Next, d′i is what it should be, so a¯i also. At last, aˆi
and aˆ′i are determined.
Assume that a′k +al +am = 1 is an equation of the given instance of (1 in
3)-SAT (all other equations are similar). We code this equation as follows:
· · · 0 t′k,l 0 a¯′k 0 · · ·
· · · 0 a¯m 0 aˆl 0 · · ·
· · · 0 4(k
+
(n
+
1)l +
m
)
+
4
0 t′k,l 0 · · ·
This enforces the equation a′k + al + am = 1 to be satisfied. Next, assume
that ak + a
′
l + ap = 1 is another such equation. If we code this equation, we
use the same variable t′k,l as above, which might seem odd. But, since
2 = (ak + a
′
k) + (al + a
′
l) ≤ (a′k + al + am) + (ak + a′l + ap) = 2
it follows that a′k + al = ak + a
′
l = 1 and am = ap = 0. Consequently,
a¯′k + aˆl = a¯k + aˆ
′
l = t
′
k,l.
So we only need to show that no collisions of symbolic digits occur, i.e.
all symbolic digits are distinct. Notice first that every sum of at most one
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a¯i and at most one aˆj is different, since (i, j) 7→ 4i + 4(n + 1)j is injective
if 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n. So all a¯i, a¯′i, aˆj, aˆ′j, ti,j, t′i,j are different. Furthermore, the di
and d′i are larger than 4(n+1)
2, so they are larger than all previous symbolic
digits. min(dn, d
′
n) = 4n(n + 3) + 2 must not relieve a carry when added to
itself, so b > 8n(n + 3) + 4 i.e. b ≥ 8(n2 + 3n + 1).
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